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In Their Own Words
An excerpt from Corrections Corporation of America (CCA),  
Letter to Shareholders, 2011:
We remain very positive about the outlook for CCA and the private corrections industry. We believe market 
dynamics continue to favor the clear value that partnership with CCA provides to local, state, and federal 
governments. Government budgets remain tight in the coming year. Funding new prisons is viewed by 
many lawmakers as diverting scarce capital resources from other critical infrastructure needs…CCA can 
help them meet their corrections needs efficiently, safely, and humanely. 
Public prisons are overcrowded and inmate populations are growing, yet states did not allocate funding 
for new correctional facilities in 2011, and new budget appropriations for 2012 look equally challenging 
for funding new facilities. In contrast, CCA has made significant investments in adding new prison beds 
resulting in an ample supply of available beds, and we believe our ability to quickly address the demand for 
new prison beds, our reputation for providing safe and secure facilities, and our leadership position in the 
industry will provide us with continued opportunities to provide an essential service with earnings growth 
for investors. . . 
We believe there is increased interest in privatizing existing prison beds to obtain cost savings and that 
future demand will likely be weighted toward beds owned and managed by the private sector.1 
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Overview
Reported crime is at the lowest level in decades,  
safe alternatives to incarceration are an accepted  
part of the corrections system, and private prisons 
have not provided the cost savings and improved 
conditions of confinement that their proponents 
promise. Nevertheless, business is booming for  
prison companies.
Since their start in the 1980s, private prisons have 
come to hold 8% of all U.S. state and federal prisoners, 
including half of federal immigration detainees. 
A steady flow of inmates has meant huge profits 
for these companies. Just as steady have been the 
reports of abuse and neglect, poor management of 
inmate needs, and poor governmental oversight. 
Low pay, limited staff training, and other cost-cutting 
measures—the primary ways private prisons sustain 
their profits—can lead to unmet inmate needs and 
security issues, heightening the inherent dangers to 
staff and inmates in secure settings. Private prison 
companies spend millions of dollars on lobbying, 
political campaign contributions, support for 
legislation favorable to their profits, shaping public 
opinion, and research likely to support their practices, 
which leads many to question the prison industry’s 
influence on criminal justice policymaking. There also 
are significant issues with the government’s ability to 
effectively monitor what goes on at private prisons. 
Proponents’ claims that private prisons can provide 
higher-quality and more cost-effective service 
provisions, improved conditions of confinement, and 
economic growth in the communities where new 
facilities are built are neither borne out in research, nor 
seen in the scores of private facility incident reports 
across the country. The expectation that competition 
for contracts among free market players would lead 
to generally improved efficiency, quality, and cost 
savings has not been met. Nevertheless, proponents 
continue to use these claims widely as a basis for 
pursuing privatization. 
This Report
This report describes the findings of conversations 
with several experts in corrections privatization, 
a review of the academic and legal literature on 
private prisons, and a media review of newspaper 
and radio stories on private prisons. It also includes 
recommendations for responding to the expansion  
of private prisons. 
Secure, locked facilities designed for adults are  
the major focus of this report, although many of the 
same issues and potential solutions apply to other 
types of privatization, in corrections and elsewhere. 
Federal immigration detention and contracted 
services, such as in-custody health care and 
programming or post-release supervision and  
services, are also briefly discussed. 
Overview
Page 5
An Introduction to Private Prisons  
in the United States
•	 Some	populations,	such	as	women,	the	
mentally ill, and serious offenders, are less 
likely to be held in private facilities because 
they are more expensive to house, making it 
difficult for prison companies to make profits. 
About one third of juveniles in residential 
placement are held in private facilities.6
Major Private Prison Companies
Today, two private companies—Corrections 
Corporation of America (CCA) and the GEO Group—
hold the majority of private prison contracts in the 
United States, with each company operating about 
65 facilities.7 GEO, formerly known as Wackenhut 
Securities, merged with Cornell Companies in 
2010. CCA and GEO are publicly traded companies 
beholden as much to their boards of directors and 
stakeholders as to the needs of the prison inmates, 
prison staff, and the general public. In 2011, the 
combined revenues of CCA and GEO totaled more 
than $3 billion.8 Other large private prison companies 
include Management & Training Corporation, Emerald 
Correctional Management, LCS Corrections Services, 
and Community Education Centers/CiviGenics. 
An Introduction to Private Prisons in 
the United States
Along with the increased number of inmates 
incarcerated in the United States due to “tough on 
crime” laws and policies that began in the 1980s and 
continued into the 2000s came an increase in the 
number of inmates held in private, for-profit facilities. 
Privatization of certain corrections functions, such as 
health care and service provisions, had been common 
in the United States for some time, but larger scale 
facilities wholly managed by for-profit companies 
began in the mid-1980s. 
The secure facilities focused on in this report are those 
where all or most of the inmates remain confined at 
all times, such as prisons, prison farms, penitentiaries, 
correctional centers, work camps, and reformatories. 
A large percentage of private facilities are community-
based facilities, such as halfway houses, residential 
treatment centers, restitution centers, and pre-release 
centers, where at least some inmates come and go. 
•	 The	most	recent	federal	data	show	that	
in 2010, of 1.6 million state and federal 
inmates, 128,195 were held in private prison 
facilities (33,830 in private federal facilities 
and 94,365 in private state facilities).2 
•	 The	percentage	of	U.S.	prisoners	held	
in private facilities rose from just 
over 3% in 1995 to 8% in 2010.3 
•	 In	2009,	U.S.	Immigration	and	Customs	
Enforcement (ICE) had an average daily 
adult population of approximately 32,606; 
about half of these detainees were housed 
in privately run detention facilities.4 
•	 Most	of	the	more	than	400	private	facilities	are	
minimum- or medium-security, with an average 
daily population of fewer than 500 inmates.5 
Sources: Beck, A. J., & Mumola, C.J. (1999). Prisoners in 1998. 
Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics; Maguire, K., & 
Pastore, A.L. (1996). Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics – 
1995. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics; Guerino, 
P., Harrison, P.M., & Sabol, W.J. (2011). Prisoners in 2010. 
Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.
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The contract usually stipulates that the government 
will pay the prison company a daily dollar amount, as 
low as $30 and up to $80 or higher, for each inmate 
they hold. These amounts are negotiated in the 
contracting process and can vary according to many 
factors, including the security level of the inmates; 
the size and type of facility; the local costs of inmate 
services and programming provided, such as food 
service, mental and physical health care provision, 
recreation, education, and vocational training; and  
the terms of the deals that prison companies are able 
to negotiate.
The development, implementation, and monitoring 
of private prison agreements represent a complicated 
and fairly unwieldy process—a fact that contributes to 
difficulty regulating and monitoring these contracts. 
In a facility operated in one jurisdiction but holding 
inmates from several others, the laws and regulations 
of any number of federal, state, and local jurisdictions 
may be in play. Arizona alone has three sets of 
corrections regulations and policies: one for Arizona 
state prisons, one for private facilities inside and 
outside Arizona borders contracted with the state to 
hold Arizona inmates, and another for private prisons 
in Arizona not contracted to hold Arizona inmates.  
The third of these is the least restrictive and specific.
The number and variety of organizations and 
individuals involved can be extensive. In the state 
or local context, the process is usually led by a chief 
executive (governor or mayor) or members of the 
state legislature, county commission, or city council. 
State or local justice system officials such as attorneys 
general, judges, and heads of corrections agencies or 
law enforcement do not typically spearhead the move 
toward privatization—they may not even support 
the move—but they and various public employees 
play some role in the process. Financiers, attorneys, 
construction companies, engineers, public utilities, 
and others are also involved, especially when a new 
facility is being constructed.
How Private Prisons Function
Federal, state, and local governments that seek to 
privatize correctional services enter into a contractual 
relationship—“a public-private partnership”—with 
a private prison company. The government typically 
announces a Request for Proposals (RFP) that 
describes the project they wish to pursue and all of 
the issues prison companies must address for their 
proposal to be considered. Governments seek these 
contracts primarily because of the ability of private 
prison companies to build or acquire facility space 
more quickly than government agencies, providing  
an easing of overcrowding and short-term time and 
cost savings compared to the government building  
its own facilities. 
The arrangement can take many forms. Some private 
facilities hold inmates from one or predominantly one 
jurisdiction, while others hold inmates from several 
jurisdictions, including out-of-state and the federal 
government. Inmates may be held in a facility owned 
and operated by the company or in a facility owned 
by the government and operated by the company. 
As an example, approximately 70% of the facilities 
CCA manages are company-owned and 30% are 
government-owned.
The company may manage the entire facility, 
providing for all inmate needs, or the government 
may still manage some aspects of the prison, such as 
medical services or programming. The company may 
only run certain elements of correctional services, 
such as inmate health care or probation supervision, 
although that is not a focus of this report. 
Some facilities are built “on spec,” where typically 
a small, rural town partners with a private prison 
company to build a facility that will house inmates 
from other jurisdictions. In this form, the private prison 
contracts with the locality for the physical facility and 
related services, and contracts with other jurisdictions 
to fill beds. 
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in securing project buy-in from other government 
representatives and community stakeholders. 
Development, maintenance, and oversight of ongoing 
contracts also involve a variety of public employees. 
Sometimes private prisons are these employees’ 
primary responsibility; other times private prisons are 
just one of several responsibilities. In the federal arena, 
responsibilities are spread across several wings of the 
Bureau of Prisons.13 In the state context, the task is 
likely spread across more disparate departments. For 
example, in Arizona, the Private Prisons subprogram 
of the state Department of Corrections’ Prison 
Operations Program develops and manages private 
prison contracts; the Engineering and Facilities Bureau 
oversees construction and compliance monitoring; 
the Contract Beds Bureau monitors, evaluates, 
and supports private prisons; and the Business 
Administration tracks expenditures.14
Prison company executives and staff play a major 
role as well, not only in representing the prison 
companies’ interests, but in assisting governments 
in the complicated process of contracting and 
implementation. Prison companies often offer to 
handle much of the paperwork and hoop-jumping 
on behalf of government entities; they are likely to 
have more experience with the process and they, of 
course, have a clear interest in the process moving as 
quickly and smoothly as possible. They also take part 
Immigration
Private prison companies have pursued the 
area of immigration both in the United States 
and internationally, with huge monetary 
success. Accompanying that success are 
numerous documented cases of abuse and 
neglect and poor conditions of confinement,9 
exacerbated by long stays awaiting 
immigration proceedings. On any given 
day in 2009, U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) held an average of 32,606 
adults in a total of 178 facilities. Just under half 
of these detainees, 15,942, were housed in 30 
private facilities.10 Although ICE has developed 
standards for immigration detention facilities, 
the standards may not adequately address 
the conditions and treatment experienced by 
many immigrant detainees and, in any case, 
they are not implemented in all facilities.11 
One example of immigration detention neglect 
is the case of Hiu Lui “Jason” Ng, who died in 
2008 while being detained in the privately run 
Wyatt Detention Facility in Central Falls, Rhode 
Island. Ng suffered from liver cancer that was 
not diagnosed until just days before his death. 
A lawsuit filed by the Rhode Island ACLU, which 
names officials and employees of both the 
Wyatt facility and ICE, noted that prison officials 
not only consistently claimed that Ng was faking 
his illness but also prevented him from receiving 
adequate medical care.12
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Private Prison Performance
While finding quick solutions to crowding is the most 
common reason jurisdictions contract for bed space 
in private prisons, secondary rationales include cost 
savings and improved services. Also, state and local 
jurisdictions seek partnerships with prison companies 
to establish private facilities as a way to boost their 
economies. While there is a shortage of high-quality 
research assessing the success of these secondary 
aims, what is known does not provide a justification 
for these decisions. 
Standards of Care
Do Private Prisons Provide Improved Conditions of 
Confinement and Inmate Services and Meet Basic 
Standards of Human Treatment?
Those concerned about private prisons not only 
question if private prisons provide better care and 
services than public facilities, but if they consistently 
meet basic standards. Individual studies have found 
that, compared to publicly managed prisons, private 
prisons experience a higher proportion of inmate-
on-inmate assaults;15 greater likelihood of inmate 
misconduct, drug abuse, and escapes;16 lower or 
unmet standards of care; and “systemic problems 
in maintaining secure facilities.”18 A review of 
several previous studies showed that the quality of 
confinement in public and private prison facilities is 
often comparable, but with public facilities providing 
slightly better skills training for inmates and reporting 
slightly fewer inmate grievances.19 
Media accounts have documented numerous 
incidents of abuse, neglect, violence, escapes, poor 
conditions, and other alarming events in private 
facilities. (For a sampling of private prison facilities 
around the country and their associated media 
reports, please see Grassroots Leadership’s resource 
packet20 and the Private Corrections Working Group 
online resource listings.21) Whether private prisons 
have more or fewer scandals than their public 
counterparts is difficult to assess from media reports, 
but it is clear that private prisons do not provide a 
consistently improved experience for inmates or staff 
compared to public facilities, and, in many cases, the 
experience can be worse. Immigration detention 
centers, where different laws and standards often 
apply, are of particular concern. (See inset, page 7.) 
Economic Claims
Do Private Prisons Provide Cost Savings  
to Governments?
While local and state governments still turn to prison 
privatization as a cost-saving measure, the cost 
effectiveness of private prisons is widely debated, 
and research on the topic has produced varied 
results. The verdict is, at best, a draw. Arizona is one 
of the few states with a state law that requires the 
regular and intensive assessment of private prison 
performance. Arizona’s most recent study found 
that private prisons resulted in higher costs to the 
state compared to public facilities.22 Other studies 
have found that privatizing facilities has resulted 
in minimal or no savings.23 Some studies, including 
those by groups affiliated with prison companies or 
their proponents, have found that privatization can 
yield modest savings.24 These findings echo what 
studies of privatization in other industries have shown: 
The promise of savings touted by proponents of 
privatization is quite limited, or, in fact, “elusive.”25 
Researchers caution that costs of public and private 
prisons cannot be easily evaluated side by side due 
to numerous factors such as security level and health 
conditions of inmates, physical characteristics of 
facilities, indirect costs, and the large number of 
parties typically involved in maintaining and paying 
for either type of prison.26 Most contracts allow private 
Private Prison Performance: 
A Discussion of the Key Claims Made by Private Prison Proponents
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fails to secure sufficient contracts to fill beds.  
At the least, the bond rating for the locality is likely 
to be lowered if it has trouble repaying the debt, 
resulting in a worsened local economy.31 When the 
lease is up or abandoned, the aging plant is owned  
by the government.
Even a healthy state or local government exposes itself 
to risk if all or part of the public prison structure is 
dismantled and reliance placed on private structures. 
Significant challenges may be experienced if the 
government or contractor then chooses to end the 
contractual relationship at a later point and the 
government is left to scramble to redevelop a public 
system or seek one of the other essentially similar 
private contractors.32 
Texas, which experienced an immense prison building 
boom in the 1990s, especially related to immigration 
detention, has experienced several examples of 
public-private partnerships that have led to challenges 
for local jurisdictions. In July 2011, a west Texas 
373-bed prison was auctioned off due to a dearth of 
prisoners, a 424-bed facility in Fort Worth (managed 
by GEO) has been empty since February 2011, and a 
recently constructed 1,100-bed facility located near 
Abilene has never housed inmates.33 
facilities to house lower risk and healthier—less 
costly—inmates than similar public facilities. Prison 
companies fund much research into cost and other 
factors; these studies tend to find improvement with 
private prisons.27
Do Private Prisons Improve the Economic Health of 
States and Localities?
For a number of years, state, county, and municipal 
jurisdictions have pursued private prison 
opportunities as a means to generate economic 
growth and job creation in their communities. Prison 
companies foreseeing increased need for bed space, 
but hoping to avoid owning expensive facilities, look 
for local governments who will agree to fund new 
facility construction through bond sales to be paid 
back from the proceeds of the prison company’s future 
contracts with other jurisdictions. These partnerships 
can appeal to smaller jurisdictions, especially when 
their traditional local industries have fallen off. Private 
prison companies espouse their potential benefits 
through campaigns to persuade key leaders and 
policymakers; they then help those key leaders sell 
the idea to other government representatives and the 
public. Much of the early discussion on investment in 
private prisons takes place behind closed doors, away 
from opposing viewpoints and the public.28 
Recent studies have found that growth and expansion 
of prisons in general (whether public or private) 
have had limited positive impact on economic 
development at the local level.29 In fact, communities 
in which private prisons are located can experience 
unfavorable economic effects, especially in already 
depressed economies. A common dynamic is that 
a small town or county commits most of its limited 
resources and infrastructure—labor force, emergency 
response services, trade services (electricians, 
plumbers, sanitation, etc.)—to supporting the prison, 
leaving the locality dependent on the success of 
the prison and unable to support other businesses 
that might want to locate there.30 Further, local 
governments that sell bonds to fund construction can 
find themselves on the hook if the prison company 
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traveling to visit a friend or family member confined  
in another state—including the fact that many prisons 
are located in rural areas far from airports—inmates 
sent to out-of-state facilities generally will not have 
visitors and, upon release, will not have benefited  
from this protective factor. (Privately run jails 
not locally situated introduce another travel 
issue: Detainees not yet sentenced need to make 
appearances in local court.37) 
Selling Public Assets
Some states try to shore up budget gaps by selling 
public prison facilities to private companies. Some 
argue this approach is a short-sighted remedy, as it 
will only reap limited and short-term financial benefits, 
decrease future options, and reduce public assets.38 
On the other hand, holding on to the asset may 
leave the government with the progressively higher 
costs of maintenance and insurance and, ultimately, 
the burden of aging facilities that the private prison 
company will eventually abandon. While prison 
companies have historically tried to avoid this 
liability by leasing facilities from city, county, or state 
governments, in 2011 CCA purchased a 1,798-bed 
facility from the state of Ohio.39 
In 2012, CCA launched a controversial initiative 
to buy existing prison facilities across the nation. 
This included contacting officials in 48 states about 
this proposal. While the company is marketing this 
approach as an opportunity to positively impact 
troubled state budgets, it clearly benefits CCA and 
perpetuates pro-incarceration policies. For example, 
any prison CCA buys under this agreement must 
house at least 1,000 beds and be managed by CCA 
for a minimum of 20 years, with a guaranteed inmate 
occupancy rate of at least 90%.40 
Does Free Market Competition Encourage 
System Improvement?
Early proponents of privatization argued that the 
competition inherent in the private market would 
spawn innovative processes and practices that would 
lower costs while improving conditions. It was also 
Montana has dealt with similar economic woes tied 
to private prison construction. Corplan Corrections 
worked with local officials to build a 464-bed facility 
in the small town of Hardin, Montana. Although the 
facility was completed in 2007, as of 2010 it had held 
no inmates due to a lack of in- or out-of-state prisoners 
suitable for the minimum security jail; in fact, Montana 
prohibits the incarceration of offenders convicted 
outside Montana. This project has left Hardin to 
cope with millions of dollars in debt.34 Ultimately, 
any financial savings gained from privatization leave 
the local area and benefit the prison corporation’s 
executives, board of directors, and shareholders, 
as well as the innumerable lobbyists, marketers, 
politicians, and government officials benefitting from 
the broader private prison industry.35 
Perhaps more importantly from an ethical perspective, 
jurisdictions that invest in speculative private 
prison projects can come to be a party to the same 
conflict of interest as prison companies when they 
find themselves in the contradictory situation of 
supporting increased incarceration in order to pay 
off bonds or bolster their local economy even if crime 
and arrests drop and effective and safe alternatives to 
incarceration are available.
Hidden Costs of Housing Prisoners Out of State 
Two issues often overlooked when prisoners are held 
out of state are the costs of prisoners who commit 
crimes while incarcerated, and inmate visitation and 
its impact on recidivism. An inmate who commits 
a serious crime while incarcerated, or who escapes 
from prison and then commits a crime, will typically 
be tried and serve time in the state where he or she is 
incarcerated, rather than the state where the original 
conviction occurred. This circumstance can result 
in the host state assuming a significant, long-term 
financial burden. 
Although empirical studies on this subject are rare, 
data show a positive relationship between inmates 
who receive visitors while incarcerated and reduced 
recidivism.36 Due to the time and costs associated with 
Page 11
for those awaiting trial or immigration procedures;45 
and alternatives to incarceration such as community 
corrections, electronic monitoring, day and evening 
reporting centers, home custody, restorative justice, 
and intensive supervision, all of which can be used 
to reduce the demand for new bed space quickly, 
permanently, and without jeopardizing public safety.46 
These strategies are, in fact, gaining a foothold. 
In 2011, legislatures in at least 26 states passed 
legislation that has the potential to reduce the prison 
population while remaining focused on public safety.47 
Some observers suggest that the fortunes of the 
private prison companies already may be starting to 
shift because of these reforms and the continuing 
drop in crime.48 Yet not everyone sees the advantages 
of these alternatives, as privatization is still a popular 
choice to ease crowding or provide short-term budget 
solutions, or both. 
Parallel Inadequate Systems
Another key issue in having two parallel approaches 
to corrections—the public and the private—is that 
the focus becomes a comparison of the two systems, 
creating a very narrow perspective from which to 
assess what works, what does not work, and how the 
overall system can be improved. Certainly, as some 
state laws specify, private prisons should be held 
to at least public prison levels of health and safety, 
conditions of confinement, service delivery, cost, 
transparency and accountability, and other factors,  
but with this being the limit of expectations, we are 
simply left with two systems in need of reform. In a 
sense, the two systems begin to “play down” to each 
other’s level of competence (or incompetence) rather 
than both vying for a truly appropriate and effective 
response to crime and solutions to the problems that 
plague both approaches.49 
thought that public prison officials would  
themselves pursue innovations, or at least pick up  
on the techniques of their for-profit counterparts  
and thereby improve the public system. 
No True Competition
Dominated as it is by CCA and the GEO Group,  
the private prison industry enjoys a relative lack of 
competition that makes it difficult for governments 
to assemble a pool of qualified candidates, and 
also contributes to the likelihood of inadequate 
performance once a contract is executed.41 If a 
particular industry only has a few providers, the 
government’s ability to realize cost savings is 
considerably lessened and it is difficult to effectively 
replace one provider with another, if the need arises.42 
Suppressing Reform
Early on, the rise of private prisons promised 
to encourage public prison officials to make 
improvements in cost efficiencies and to be more 
open to other reforms.43 However, it is more likely 
that the opposite has occurred, as a larger dynamic 
has taken hold that contributes to a suppression 
of innovative thinking and reform in the public 
sphere. When states relieve overcrowding in public 
facilities through private contracting, stakeholders—
state officials, prosecutors, judges, and corrections 
agencies—lose the impetus to seek innovative ways 
of reducing reliance on incarceration and to save 
taxpayer money without threatening public safety. 
Thus, the prison population continues to grow, as 
do corrections budgets, at least until the newly 
contracted beds are themselves full.44 The speed and 
flexibility with which private prison companies can 
acquire bed space provides, in essence, a permanent 
pressure release valve that quashes what might 
otherwise be an opportunity for permanent reform. 
Importantly (and ironically), the very reforms that 
are not given enough consideration can serve the 
same purpose as private prisons, including the quick 
easing of crowding, cost savings, and improved 
outcomes. These include alternatives to detention 
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The Profit Motive 
A major concern expressed by privatization  
opponents is the suitability of entrusting prisoner care 
to profit-motivated corporations.50 Within facilities, 
this issue can play out in a number of ways, beginning 
with the core issue of staffing. Beyond facilities, the 
profit motive leads prison companies to use their 
significant resources to influence corrections laws and 
policies in ways that increase their profits through 
more prisoners being held for more types of crimes 
and for longer sentences.
Staffing and Services
A critical part of the debate regarding cost savings, 
as well as conditions and quality of care, focuses on 
staffing and personnel costs. Since private prisons 
are generally expected to serve the same function 
as public prisons but also save public money, prison 
companies need to make their profit in the small 
window between their own costs and the costs of 
public prisons, minus some percentage of savings to 
taxpayers. (Some contracts stipulate that this savings 
will be at least a certain percentage, such as 7%.)  
The most expensive part of running a prison is staffing; 
therefore any savings associated with privatization 
are primarily due to reduced personnel-related 
costs.51 Private prisons tend to employ frontline staff 
who are non-unionized and low-paid, receive few 
fringe benefits, and lack sufficient training. These 
circumstances contribute to the high rate of staff 
turnover and the security issues with which privately 
managed facilities are often fraught.52 In turn, the high 
rate of staff turnover results in a lack of mentoring  
for new employees.53 Similarly, cost cutting with 
regard to services, programming, and facility 
conditions will increase inmate dissatisfaction and 
inmate-staff tension, and increase negative outcomes 
like grievances and behavioral issues. This suggests 
that any cost savings achieved by privatization is at 
the expense of inmate, guard, and public safety.
When a public facility is replaced by a private prison, 
public facility staff are often unwilling to work for  
the private operator for a variety of reasons, including 
substantially lower pay, poor benefits, and safety 
concerns. This leads to a loss of seasoned, trained 
employees who can mentor new staff and establish  
a culture of professionalism and appropriate treatment 
of prisoners. Conversely, staff who had worked at a 
private prison may be ineligible for employment at 
publicly operated facilities based on factors such as 
the lack of training and experience mandated by state 
standards, or failed background checks. 
Influence on Length of Stay
The potential conflict of interest posed by private 
prisons being compensated per filled bed can also 
arise through the influence prison staff can have on 
the length of time inmates spend behind bars. As in 
public prisons, disciplinary action against an inmate 
is typically initiated by guards and verified by their 
supervisors. Marks on an inmate’s record may lead to 
formal proceedings that can, ultimately, reduce the 
inmate’s chances of early release or extend his or her 
initial sentence. Parole decisions also are influenced 
by inmates’ in-custody record, and parole boards often 
ask for the opinion of prison officials. While individual 
prison staff are unlikely to have a direct personal 
financial incentive for pursuing disciplinary action,  
the private prison company and its shareholders 
directly benefit from longer lengths of stay. The 
seriousness of this risk is illustrated by the fact that 
several states have enacted laws and policies that 
address its likelihood.54 
The Policy End Run
Privatization opponents are concerned with the 
risk of policies and practices being defined by costs 
The Profit Motive: 
Conflict of Interest in Real TermsHeadline Headline Headline Headline
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over $3.7 million to individual political candidates, 
party committees, and ballot measure committees.57 
The New York Times recently quoted a former 
chief prison inspector—who happens to favor 
privatization—in Australia as saying, “We have lost 
control…These big global companies, in relation 
to specific activities, are more powerful than the 
governments they’re dealing with.”58
Prison Company Lobbying
Another key area of concern is the lobbying  
done on behalf of the private prison industry.  
Prison industry lobbyists seek to impact sentencing 
policies as well as the rules and regulations included  
in government contracts. In 2010, CCA, GEO, and 
Cornell Companies together spent more than  
$1.5 million on federal lobbying.59 
Prison Company Influence on Criminal Justice 
Policymaking and Law
Private prison companies have been influential in  
the development and passage of state legislation  
that increases incarceration, including “three strikes” 
and “truth in sentencing” laws in the mid-1990s.60 
More recently, as immigration detention continues 
to represent a growing market for private prison 
corporations, the industry has been instrumental 
in the drafting and enacting of influential state 
legislation. A striking example of the industry’s 
influence is Arizona’s SB 1070, which substantially 
increased law enforcement’s options to detain any 
individual who is perceived to be an undocumented 
immigrant.61 This legislation was developed under 
the auspices of the nonprofit American Legislative 
Exchange Council (ALEC), whose membership includes 
lawmakers and powerful corporations such as, until 
recently, CCA.62 An investigation found that the 
majority of SB 1070’s 36 co-sponsors subsequently 
received contributions from prison lobbyists or from 
the major private prison companies.63 Since SB 1070 
was signed into law in 2010, the U.S. Department of 
Justice has sued the state of Arizona on the grounds 
that the law is unconstitutional, and an injunction 
alone and put into place without the normal process 
of debate and approval. For instance, private prison 
companies perhaps reasonably argue that contracts 
need to give them flexibility to respond to unforeseen 
challenges or to develop creative practices.55 In 
practice, this open-endedness may allow them to 
implement practices that go against the intentions  
of the contract or the best interest of the inmates  
or the public. There is a difference between flexibility 
and free license to interpret contracts and prioritize 
cost savings over other concerns.
The Political Influence of Prison Companies
Since the modern emergence of private prisons in  
the mid-1980s, an intricately connected web of 
political influence has developed alongside the 
growth of the private prison industry. Because  
private prisons rely on a steady stream of inmates  
to fill beds, it is perhaps not surprising that the  
private prison industry has been pivotal in helping  
to shape and promote criminal justice policies that 
favor incarceration as well as putting and keeping  
pro-privatization lawmakers in office.56 
By making financial contributions to political 
campaigns and related efforts, private prison 
companies exert influence over policymaking that 
helps assure the demand for their services as well as 
develop and maintain relationships that can assist 
them in obtaining prison contracts. Between 2004 and 
2010, CCA, GEO, and Cornell Companies donated  
Source: National Institute on Money in State Politics  
(http://www.followthemoney.org).
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presence of private prisons makes true reform of the 
system less likely, and that prison companies use their 
influence to perpetuate and worsen the laws and 
policies that have led to the overuse of incarceration 
in this country. The next section describes how 
government oversight of private prisons has been 
inadequate, but shows that contracting (including 
strong oversight) can be used to curtail the growth  
of and deficiencies in private prisons.
was issued to block enforcement of some of its key 
provisions. The U.S. Supreme Court began hearing 
arguments on SB 1070 in April 2012.64 
Private prison corporations also mobilize against 
legislation that would have a negative impact on 
its industry. This includes the federal Private Prison 
Information Act, which has been introduced by 
lawmakers several times in the past decade, including 
during the 2011–12 legislative session. Reports 
indicate that CCA has spent millions of dollars to lobby 
against this legislation, which would require private 
facilities housing federal inmates to abide by the same 
Freedom of Information Act guidelines that apply to 
public federal prisons.65
Friends in High Places: Prison Company 
Relationship Building
There are many examples of close connections 
between the major prison companies and current or 
former government officials who have the potential to 
assist these companies.66 A prison company strategy is 
to add a corrections official—in a consultant role—to 
a prison company’s board of directors; the consultant 
advocates for privatization from his or her vantage 
point. When the conflict of interest is disclosed, the 
consultant is hired by the private firm at a generous 
salary.67 A recent case in point is CCA’s 2011 hiring of 
Harley Lappin, the past director of the federal Bureau 
of Prisons, to serve as an executive vice president and 
chief corrections officer for the company.68
The profit incentive also has been known to 
spawn serious corruption. For instance, in Luzerne, 
Pennsylvania, agents of a private prison company were 
found to have paid bribes to local judges to encourage 
them to commit youth to their two local facilities.69 
In Willacy County, Texas, two county commissioners 
were found to have accepted bribes in exchange for 
favoring certain companies involved in building a new 
private facility.70 
The previous sections show how private prisons are  
a pervasive but unnecessary part of the U.S. 
corrections system. In addition, it is clear that the 
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Contracting, Oversight, and Monitoring
prison companies are often poorly drafted and may 
minimize or omit key provisions, which can lead to 
numerous problems including inadequate contractor 
performance, absence of transparency, abuse of 
prisoner rights, and an overall lack of accountability.73 
Oversight and monitoring has also proven to be 
difficult and tends to be lax and ineffective. 
Transparency Issues
The absence of consistently enforced controls and 
oversight mechanisms has resulted in the growth of 
an exceedingly powerful industry that “flourish[es] in 
the shadows.”74 One area of concern is a general lack 
of tracking, reporting, and accessibility of data on 
inmates. Private prison contractors, unlike government 
agencies, are not typically required to report on 
the inmates housed in privately run prisons, do not 
make these data easily accessible to monitors, or 
are even aware of the documentation and reporting 
requirements intrinsic to the operation of public 
agencies.75 Further, from a financial perspective, it 
Contracting, Oversight,  
and Monitoring
Public-private partnerships hinge on contracts. 
Contracts are more than promises of future 
collaboration. A contract provides a jurisdiction 
with a mechanism to clearly identify the contractor’s 
responsibilities and requirements; to prescribe  
how this work will be accomplished, compensated, 
and monitored; and to describe penalties that will  
be incurred if performance is substandard.  
A comprehensive, sound contracting procedure  
is a central and crucial feature of an effective prison 
privatization effort.71 Within the contract should be 
detailed descriptions of how the contract and the 
functioning of the private prison will be overseen and 
monitored by the government. Lessons can be learned 
from all types of governmental privatization, not just 
in corrections.72 
The experience of various jurisdictions has 
demonstrated that contracts executed with private 
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prison, public or private, is difficult, partly because 
of the necessarily closed and isolated setting of 
secure facilities. Privatization, however, adds another 
complicated layer to that isolation, often one where 
the private prison company has motivation to resist 
efforts toward transparency and accountability.
is in the contractor’s best interest to minimize the 
reporting of data that could provide important—
though potentially negative—information about 
conditions of confinement, such as the number of 
assaults that take place in the facility, incident reports, 
and grievances filed.76 Laws requiring full transparency 
and access to data, stronger contracts, and intensive 
oversight can help alleviate these concerns. 
Guaranteed Payments
The daily population of a prison will vary, but prison 
companies have negotiated for some very favorable 
terms regarding this fluctuation. Contracts often 
guarantee a minimum occupancy rate—usually 
90% or more77 —and allow private prison operators 
to overstate costs and maximize revenue. Fees may 
escalate when the rate is exceeded.78 Several kinds 
of payment structures may be incorporated into a 
contract besides the per-bed method, including a 
fixed price, “indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity” 
approach, which allows that prison beds will be 
provided by the contractor on an as-needed basis.79 
Monitoring
“[E]ven carefully drafted contracts cannot prevent 
many decisions by private contractors that might 
yield inhumane conditions of confinement.”80 In 
addition to—and part of—contracting, another critical 
feature of a private prison operation is designing, 
implementing, and maintaining a strong monitoring 
program.81 Oversight and monitoring provide a way 
for the government to measure contract compliance, 
and must concentrate on the contractor’s adherence 
to contract terms as well as its success in securing the 
safety of the public, inmates, and staff. Monitoring can 
and should address all parts of a contract, with key 
areas including security issues, legal and constitutional 
requirements, conditions of confinement, medical 
and mental health services, all aspects of staffing, 
records and reports, and inmate programming. 
Monitoring also provides a basis for contract renewals 
or terminations and for charging fees and other 
penalties.82 Monitoring of conditions inside any 
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Other Forms of  
Corrections Privatization 
The privatization of various correctional elements, 
apart from whole facilities, also continues to grow. In 
these cases, a government agency will contract with 
a provider to supply a service such as health care or 
programming for inmates. The reasons for pursuing 
these contractual relationships are typically cost 
savings and improvements in the quality and effective 
delivery of service through the specialization that 
private groups can develop. 
Privatization of Health Care
A 2005 survey of state corrections departments found 
that 32 states contracted with private companies 
for some or all of their prison health care services.83 
Opponents of privatized health care cite concerns 
that this profit-driven approach may result in 
insufficient staffing levels; a lack of appropriate 
treatment for prisoners, such as delays that are longer 
than medically indicated in sending inmates to the 
emergency room;84 and oversight issues.85 
Recent developments in this area include one state 
moving forward to privatize correctional health care, 
while another is scrutinizing the private company 
that provides health care at most of its facilities. In 
2012, the state of Florida is pursuing plans to privatize 
correctional health care statewide. This has led to a 
lawsuit brought by the Florida Nurses’ Association 
challenging the state’s authority on this issue.86 In 
Maine, a 2011 state review found that Corizon, the 
company that provides health care at most of the 
state’s correctional facilities, did not meet many of its 
contractual requirements; as a result, future contracts 
for correctional health care services in the state will be 
subject to a competitive bidding process, which has 
not previously been the case.87 
Privatization of Probation and Parole
Other correctional areas experiencing growth in 
Other Forms of Corrections Privatization
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privatization include probation and parole. One 
reason for the shift from public to private supervision 
has been an increase in the number of probationers, 
leading to an expansion in state probation officers’ 
caseloads; this growth has been accompanied by 
state budgets that have limited capacity to address 
this change. A 2007 report found that about 10 states 
contract with private agencies to provide supervision 
of an estimated 300,000 clients on court-ordered 
probation, typically for misdemeanor, low-risk 
offenses.88 While the overall number of individuals 
on probation or parole in the United States increased 
during the last few decades, the national numbers 
have decreased slightly in recent years.89 It is not clear 
if these trends will continue, but it is apparent that 
prison companies recognize supervision services as a 
growth area.90 
Concerns about privatized probation include the focus 
on profitmaking through collection of fees and fines 
from the offender, with little or no attention paid to an 
individual’s underlying issues such as substance use or 
unemployment,91 as well as an absence of standards 
for many aspects of the industry, which, among 
other things, can allow parole or probation officers’ 
compensation to be directly connected to the fees he 
or she collects.92 Recommendations for improving the 
selection, performance, and accountability of private 
probation officers include developing more rigorous 
statewide requirements for the private supervision 
of probationers, increasing training and educational 
standards for private agency staff, toughening agency 
reporting obligations, and evaluating whether 
private probation providers have achieved stated 
performance goals. Other areas that could be included 
in a contract with a private probation provider 
include details about criminal background checks 
for individuals working as probation officers and 
procedures for working with indigent offenders.93 
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Recommendations for Responding  
to the Expansion of Private Prisons
need to be held to the same standard of transparency, 
accountability, and legality. 
Reduce the Demand for Privatization Through 
Advocacy for Sentencing Reform and Other Laws 
and Policies Impacting Incarceration Rates
A key argument made by private prison proponents 
is the industry’s ability to respond relatively quickly to 
bed space needs. However, as described in this report, 
relying on private prisons to ease crowding comes at 
the detriment to reform in the public system. Even 
with the relative speed with which prison companies 
work, much effort goes into the development 
and implementation of a private prison—efforts 
that would be better spent on reducing the use of 
incarceration through the existing means described in 
this report.94 
Detention and sentencing reform is a critical strategy 
by which the government can reduce its reliance 
on incarceration and thereby reduce the need—the 
demand—for private prisons. This strategy includes 
the revision of the policies and practices that hastened 
prisons’ growth, including “tough on crime” statutes, 
detention decisions, mandatory minimums, truth 
in sentencing, sentence enhancements, reduced 
authority of judges vs. increased power of prosecutors, 
and mandatory time for parole and probation 
violations. Some states are already pursuing reforms; a 
continued emphasis on reduced use of incarceration, 
increased use of alternatives, and reduced returns to 
prison after release is a crucial way to downsize the 
perceived need for prison beds while simultaneously 
reducing reliance on the private prison industry.95 
Research shows that incarceration does not typically 
correlate with reduced recidivism; neither do longer 
prison sentences—an indication, again, that overuse 
of incarceration, whether in public or private facilities, 
does not serve the best interests of the inmates or  
the public.96 
Recommendations for Responding  
to the Expansion of Private Prisons 
The following recommendations arise from the 
growing understanding (and the need for still 
greater understanding) of the true impacts of private 
prisons; the shortcomings of the current processes 
for implementing and maintaining private facilities, 
including contracting and monitoring practices; and 
the experience of stakeholders across the country who 
have worked tirelessly to counteract the expansion of 
corrections privatization.
Beginning with the reduction of demand for private 
prisons through reduced dependence on incarceration 
as a response to crime, the recommendations 
range from major changes in corrections policy to 
local education and organizing activities. Private 
prison companies and their proponents have the 
resources and political clout necessary to affect public 
perceptions of privatization and corrections policy 
generally, and to perpetuate current growth trends. It 
is important that alternative perspectives be allowed 
to counter these powerful, profit-centered efforts.
Sentencing Reform and New Legislation  
and Regulation
Private prison companies already enjoy a large 
influence in the corrections field. However, new, 
tougher, and more specific laws and regulations 
can improve how these companies are regulated, 
monitored, and allowed to operate. There are a 
number of legislative and regulative avenues to be 
pursued regarding private prisons: Limit power and 
influence; limit types and scopes of facilities; create 
standards regarding transparency of company policies 
and practices, what laws apply, and minimum levels 
and quality of care; and maximize accountability and 
responsiveness to issues that arise. Most of these 
apply to the private prisons, but elected officials also 
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Legal Action 
Some groups and individuals have pursued legal 
actions to block prison privatization efforts. Recent 
legal actions have taken several forms, including  
the following: 
•	 In	2011,	the	Florida	Police	Benevolent	
Association, representing unionized corrections 
officers, filed a lawsuit claiming that the 
legislature violated state law by inserting a 
directive regarding privatization of corrections 
department operations in budget language 
rather than proposing and passing it as 
legislation.101 This claim was upheld in state 
court, with the judge concluding that private 
prison proponents had attempted an end 
run of the normal legislative process.102 
•	 Also	in	Florida	in	2011,	an	ethics	complaint	was	
filed by the Teamsters union against Governor 
Rick Scott, claiming his move to privatize 
prisons in part of the state is compromised due 
to the fact that he received campaign-related 
contributions from CCA and the GEO Group.103 
•	 While	they	have,	for	the	most	part,	not	held	up	in	
court, suits have challenged the constitutionality 
of privatization of functions that are “inherently 
governmental;” that is, that leave the application 
Reform of Parole and Probation Policies and  
Reentry Strategies
The private prison industry relies on ex-inmates 
reoffending and returning to prison, and on sentences 
stemming from probation violations.97 Offenders can 
avoid re-incarceration if there are more opportunities 
for skills training while individuals are incarcerated,98 
reentry plans, advocacy for state-level policies that 
will remove obstacles for former inmates to access 
supportive services and obtain employment,99 and 
policy reform. 
Support Legislation That Seeks to Increase 
Transparency and Improve Accountability  
of Private Prison Companies
Proposed federal legislation, such as the Private  
Prison Information Act, would help to shed light 
on the finances and activities of private prison 
companies.100 Another opportunity lies in the area 
of legislation and regulations regarding lobbying, 
conflicts of interest, and transparency in privatized 
activities. Also needed is better access to private 
prisons’ financial data in order to track the true costs  
of running a private prison.
Individuals and organizations wanting to impact 
the private prison process can seek full disclosure 
of affiliations of those involved in private prison 
projects, establish watchdog groups with resources 
and authority for strong oversight and quick action, 
and pursue laws and regulations that define the ethics 
and legality of relationships and conflicts of interest. 
Another avenue to consider is providing expertise to 
help jurisdictions develop contracts that provide for 
strong, accountability-based monitoring and serious 
repercussions when ethics issues and other types of 
non-compliance arise.
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with economic or justice trends. Each element of 
the contract should be linked to a specific method 
for monitoring and oversight, and to clearly defined 
ramifications for non-compliance. 
Provide Technical Assistance to Local Government 
Entities to Draft Effective Requests for Proposals 
(RFPs) and Contracts
Experts emphasize the importance of developing a 
well-constructed request for proposals (RFP) at the 
outset of the contracting process. An RFP provides a 
way for a government agency to state the services it 
wishes to contract for and solicit bids from vendors. 
A well-crafted and thorough RFP can ensure that 
proposals put forth by prison companies are thorough, 
detailed, responsive, and verifiable. An RFP that clearly 
articulates a jurisdiction’s specific needs and provides 
guidelines for responsive proposals will, in turn, guide 
the evaluation of RFPs and ultimately help define the 
content of a contract between a jurisdiction and a 
private prison operator.105 
Due to the vital role the RFP plays in shaping the 
contracting process, local government entities, such 
as counties, would benefit from receiving technical 
assistance on drafting effective RFPs. This could 
include examples of contracting issues (e.g., problems 
that typically crop up once a prison is being operated 
by a private company) and suggested language to 
address these issues.106 Other kinds of recommended 
training and technical assistance could cover key 
elements to include in contracts, such as specific 
provisions related to data keeping, data reporting, and 
monitoring, as well as a requirement that contractors 
comply with federal and state law as well as any 
relevant departmental policies and procedures.107 
Training could be provided by individuals with 
experience in this field as well as through pro bono 
consultations with attorneys who specialize in 
contract law.
Explore Performance-based Contracting Options
One way of requiring private prison contractors 
to achieve a jurisdiction’s desired practices and 
of U.S. laws and statutes to the discretion of 
a private contractor. (See Lucas Anderson’s 
compilation of applicable laws in each state.104) 
•	 Individual	lawsuits	regarding	abuse	or	neglect	
of inmates in private facilities can target private 
prison companies’ revenue, although the 
companies expect and are prepared for a certain 
number of these suits. While the costs of suing 
private prison companies can be returned to the 
state or local government in the form of higher 
contracting fees and overages, civil suits are 
an important means for individual restitution, 
spotlighting problems, and maintaining a check 
and balance on prison company practices.
Stronger Contracting, Oversight,  
and Monitoring 
Contracts provide an opportunity to address issues 
not dealt with in laws and regulations. An effective 
contract is essential to minimizing the potential for 
harm when a jurisdiction enters into a relationship 
with a private prison company. There is a growing 
understanding of what constitutes a solid contract, 
with high levels of specificity representing a key 
element. Contracts need to reflect a jurisdiction’s 
policy and values, and need to foresee and forestall 
as many issues as possible, such as potential end 
runs around policy and increases in costs associated 
Page 22
outcomes, such as data reporting or successful 
prisoner rehabilitation, is through the application 
of performance-based contracting. A relatively 
new trend in the public sector encouraged through 
federal guidelines such as the Fair Acquisition 
Regulations, performance-based contracting allows 
governments to identify specific outcomes that 
private prison contractors should achieve and to 
hinge compensation on meeting these goals.108 One 
performance-based approach gaining popularity 
is guarantees on the part of the contractor that the 
government will achieve set levels of cost savings, 
such as a 7% improvement over the costs in public 
facilities. This particular tactic may have its benefits, 
but it also risks placing still greater emphasis on cost 
savings. Other performance-based approaches would 
link payment or incentives to meeting standards for 
conditions of confinement, successful completion of 
programming and services on the part of inmates, or a 
reduction in reoffending after release.
Implement Meaningful Penalties  
for Non-compliance
Contracts can include provisions for levying financial 
penalties against the contractor if contract terms 
are breached. In practice, however, these often 
fail to discourage private prison companies from 
overstepping. Fines are often set at a relatively low 
level, such that it may be more cost-effective for a 
prison contractor to cut corners and pay a fine than 
to comply with the contract terms. Additionally, 
the process by which fines may be levied is often 
not clearly spelled out in contracts or consistently 
applied and monitored.109 Jurisdictions that enter 
into contracts with private prison companies should 
consider developing penalties that will have a 
measurable impact on private prison operators; these 
penalties, and their application, should be specified in 
the contract and subsequently followed. 
Other Important Elements of Contracts
Contracts should include detailed and workable  
plans for monitoring. A monitoring plan should 
include what will be monitored and how, by whom, 
how it will be paid for, and how issues uncovered  
will be addressed. 
Contracts should also establish minimum 
qualifications for key staff positions, including guards 
and direct service personnel in facilities, and probation 
and parole caseworkers. These standards should meet 
or exceed all applicable federal and state guidelines.
Assess, Understand, Organize, Educate 
Slow Down the Privatization Process
A consistent element of efforts to establish or expand 
privatization of corrections is a sense of urgency. 
Proponents of privatization will stress this “time factor” 
as they push to move the complicated process forward 
at the risk of limiting important areas including due 
process for public comment; careful review of various 
factors contributing to the perceived need, potential 
impact, long-term costs of the change, and viable 
alternatives; careful consideration of applicable laws, 
regulations, and policies; and development of a strong 
and thorough contract. When behind-the-scenes 
negotiations finally come to light, stakeholders are 
often at a disadvantage as projects already have 
momentum. In the recent court ruling against private 
prison proponents in Florida, the judge said, “From the 
record, it appears that the rush to meet the deadlines 
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to the private prison industry. Further research is 
needed in numerous areas such as rates of incidents of 
abuse or neglect, rates of victimization, and conditions 
of confinement; the ways the profit incentive impacts 
facility safety and security, and the humane treatment 
of inmates; the influence of prison companies 
on legislation, regulation, and policies regarding 
sentencing, parole and probation, immigration policy, 
and the individuals involved; cost savings and the true 
costs of private prison operation, including indirect 
costs and costs likely to be borne by public agencies, 
such as procurement, insurance, emergency services, 
and case management;111 monitoring efforts and 
in the proviso has resulted in many shortcomings  
in the evaluation of whether privatization is in  
the best public interest as it relates to cost and 
effective service.”110 
Organize and Seek Partners
Not all government representatives involved favor 
a move toward privatization. The decision to pursue 
privatization is usually made by a jurisdiction’s chief 
executive or policymakers: the governor, mayor, 
county executive, city manager, legislature, city 
council, etc. Representatives of related county or 
city agencies—such as corrections, probation, law 
enforcement, and the court—are likely to have 
involvement, but are not necessarily supportive of 
the move to privatization. Community members and 
consultants, as well as local, county, state, and national 
advocacy groups, can also play a role. Legislative 
representatives are often in charge of the contracting 
process. Advocates can build alliances or coalitions 
with stakeholder individuals and organizations that 
have similar goals. 
Educate Communities and Policymakers
Communities do not necessarily understand the 
potential impact and various implications of having a 
private prison facility in their town or city. Community 
members may wish to educate themselves, their 
neighbors, and policymakers about the challenges 
and benefits that are typical of private prisons. 
This report cannot provide a comprehensive picture of 
the contracting, monitoring, and oversight practices, 
as well as the challenges created by private prisons, 
nor of the numerous players and stakeholders in the 
process, the variations in the level of privatization, 
inmate populations, services provided, and state 
and local law and regulation. However, efforts to 
impact privatization strategies will require a strong 
understanding of these and other elements as they 
apply to individual jurisdictions. 
Further Research on Corrections Privatization
Reliable information is crucial to informing a response 
Efforts to Curb Expansion at the 
State Level
In 2011, states that considered privatizing 
correctional facilities included Florida, 
Louisiana, and Ohio. These proposals were 
met with resistance by community members, 
and, in some cases, by lawmakers. In Louisiana, 
Association of Federal, State, County, and 
Municipal Employees (AFSCME) members 
protested a proposed plan by Governor Bobby 
Jindal to sell three state prison facilities to 
private prison operators; Jindal’s proposal was 
also not supported by the state legislature and 
did not move forward.112 In Ohio, a proposal 
by Governor John Kasich to sell five prisons, 
opposed by AFSCME and the Ohio Civil 
Service Employees Association, was revised 
to the sale of one prison to CCA and the 
turnover of operations of two other prisons 
to Management & Training Corporation.113 
Finally, Florida governor Rick Scott’s effort to 
privatize prisons in south Florida, which would 
have impacted more than 25 prisons and work 
camps in that region, was voted down by the 
state senate in early 2012—the culmination 
of an extremely contentious debate on 
privatization in the state where the GEO Group 
is headquartered.114 
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practices in private prisons; meaningful responses to 
contract non-compliance; and privatized correctional 
services such as medical and mental health care, 
probation and parole, and programming.115 Also 
needed are studies of the relative bias of the various 
sources of information and research on private 
prisons, including those funded by prison companies. 
Approaches to Monitoring: More Than  
Just Accreditation
Monitoring is “a process, requiring constant attention 
and vigilance. Effective oversight of a prison is thus 
necessarily a labor-intensive endeavor.”116 Private 
prison monitors typically use several different 
methods to assess contract compliance, such as 
reviews of files, reports, logs, and other records 
(including spot-checking of records for accuracy); 
onsite observations; interviews with key stakeholders 
(managers, staff, and inmates); and statistical 
comparisons to an analogous publicly operated 
prison.117 However, some monitoring plans fail to allow 
for what most would consider basic requirements, 
such as unannounced site visits.118 The monitoring 
process should also take into account more intangible, 
unrecorded factors including a prison’s climate,  
guard-to-inmate communications, and staff decision 
making, an approach that is described as follows 
by Collins: “Experienced corrections officials know 
that a prison may comply chapter and verse with 
the specifics of a contract and still not be a safe and 
healthy facility.”119
As part of the contract between a jurisdiction and 
a private prison company, the company is typically 
required to obtain and maintain accreditation from 
the American Correctional Association (ACA). An 
important distinction between ACA accreditation 
and outcome monitoring is that ACA accreditation 
focuses on processes and procedures, rather than 
on outcomes. Experts caution against relying too 
heavily on ACA accreditation to measure institutional 
effectiveness and recommend a close linkage between 
what is called “paper-based” accreditation and regular, 
onsite monitoring of contract compliance, service 
quality, and outcomes.120 
Another strategy, as part of an overall monitoring  
plan, is to convene a citizen oversight committee  
that augments the functions performed by the 
professional and government monitors and 
monitoring consultants.121 
Affiliation and Expertise of the Monitor
The monitor’s training as well as his or her relationship 
to the facility is an important concern. While the 
A Prison Break in Arizona and Subsequent Reforms
The recent experience of a private prison in Kingman, Arizona, operated by Management & Training Corporation 
(MTC), illustrates the need for various improvements and additions to standard contracts, including planning 
related to occupancy and compensation, as well as provisions concerning security and monitoring. After several 
inmates escaped from Kingman in 2010—which resulted in the murders of two people—the state transferred 
more than 200 high risk inmates from the Kingman facility to another prison and determined that additional 
prisoners would not be sent to Kingman until MTC complied with identified problems, including retraining of 
corrections officers. This meant that MTC’s guaranteed minimum occupancy rate of 97% was not met for nearly 
a year. In response to the state’s action, MTC filed a “notice of claim” against the state, seeking approximately $10 
million in revenue that was lost when the state stopped supplying Kingman with inmates. This series of events 
led the state department of corrections to revamp its RFP process to include stipulations that private prisons will 
have to provide additional security regardless of the security level of inmates; state monitors will have continuous, 
unscheduled access to the facility, inmates, and records; and fines of $25,000 can be levied for certain violations.122 
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monitor may be a consultant or subcontractor, this 
person may be paid by the prison operator, creating a 
potential conflict of interest. In rural areas, the monitor 
may be an individual who lives in or is otherwise 
embedded in the community where the prison is 
situated, leading to possible tension or bias in pointing 
out problems that could affect many residents’ 
livelihoods.123 Also, monitors should have considerable 
expertise in the area(s) they are monitoring. In the 
case of prison health care services, monitors should 
be medical providers who work for the state or county 
and who can knowledgeably evaluate the quality of 
services that inmates receive.124 
Improve Transparency Through Data Keeping  
and Reporting and Access to Data
Private prisons are generally not required to report 
data to the local or state government with which  
they contract, or to any oversight body. Information  
is a powerful tool for advocacy; the lack of useful  
data reduces the accountability of prison companies, 
thus putting inmates and guards at risk. Data keeping 
and reporting practices that make information  
readily accessible will help facilitate monitoring.  
It is necessary to build specific requirements for  
data collection and reporting into the contract.125 
These steps could help to correct the transparency 
and accountability issues that often appear endemic 
to the private prison industry. 
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Conclusion
Conclusion 
For the most part, the way private prison companies run their businesses—keeping costs down; pursuing favorable 
contracts; influencing laws, policies, and public opinion that most support them; maximizing profits—is not out of 
line with other for-profit enterprises. What sets them apart, however, is their responsibility for a hugely important 
and difficult undertaking: ensuring the humane treatment of prisoners, carrying out the rule of law, and preserving 
safety in the facilities. They serve a crucial government function, yet they approach the task from a strikingly different 
perspective than the governments and the public they serve.
While it is important not to oversimplify the many factors that contribute to crime and the corrections populations, 
even the strongest supporters of “tough on crime” policies would agree that the best-case scenario is fewer inmates  
in custody as long as public safety is not diminished. The public supports efforts to reduce the use of incarceration 
when those efforts are shown to be practical and effective.126 Ultimately, this leaves only those with a financial interest  
in private prisons supporting the filling of more beds in secure facilities. 
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